Tactic 8. Prevent Rogue IXPs

This defensive tactic prevents the erosion of unique routes from the IXP by preventing an alternative Public Peering fabric from splintering the population. Here are a couple of examples:

1.  European IXP colo shield. Job Witteman (AMS-IX) pointed out that the AMS-IX colocation providers are not allowed to operate their own switching fabrics. This stipulation is part of the agreement to receive the AMS-IX switches. However, a colocation provider is allowed to run cross-connects and thus support Private Peering within its colocation environment.

2.  Rogue IXP within colo. Some ISPs have complained about the cost of peering within certain IXPs and have threatened to implement their own peering fabric intended to displace the “overpriced” switching fabrics operated by the IXP.

These rogue IXP efforts have failed to attract critical mass for at least two reasons. First, the colocation operator is still responsible for running the cross-connects between the providers and the rogue IXP. They are in the position to disconnect the rogue IXP. This threat is enough to give some ISPs pause. Secondly, the colocation or dominant IXP operator has access to a flow of prospective customers as a matter of course, while the rogue IXP is typically operated as an ad hoc group of volunteers. While the low price is attractive, the volunteer staff does not communicate credibility or sustainability to the prospective customer.

Value of the IXP = f(p, r, v, m) - c

p: The population

r: The routes available

v: The volume of traffic exchanged

m: The market perception of the IXP

c: The cost of participatioon at the IXP